Reconstitution of Title: Proof by Clear and Convincing Evidence. Remedy in Case of Denial.
“Reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title may be done judicially, in accordance with the special procedure laid down in R.A. No. 26 or administratively, in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 6732.” [Marcelino dela Paz vs. Republic of the Philippines (G.R. No. 195726, dated November 20, 2017)].
Administrative reconstitution of title under RA No. 6732 may only be availed of in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood or other force majeure as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority: Provided, That the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged should be at least ten percent (10%) of the total number in the possession of the Office of the Register of Deeds: Provided, further, That in no case shall the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged be less than five hundred (500).
In all other cases, a petition in court may be filed to reconstitute loss or destroyed title in accordance with the procedure laid down in RA No. 26, thus:
Section 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f), 3(c), 3(d), 3(e) and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by the registered owner, his assigns, or any person having an interest in the property. The petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that no co-owner's mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or, if any had been issued, the same had been lost or destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any, which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such buildings or improvements; (e) the names and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the owners of the adjoining properties and all persons who may have any interest in the property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and (g) a statement that no deeds or other instruments affecting the property have been presented for registration, or, if there be any, the registration thereof has not been accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources enumerated in section 2(f) of 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further be accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title covering the same property.
Proof by Clear and Convincing Evidence.
In the case of Marcelino dela Paz cited above, the Supreme Court discussed reconstitution of title and emphasized a diligent evaluation of the evidence to be presented before the petition may be granted, thus:
“Reconstitution is the restoration of the instrument or title allegedly lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. Its only purpose is to have the title reproduced, after observing the procedure prescribed by law, in the same form they were when the loss or destruction occurred.
The process involves diligent circumspect evaluation of the authenticity and relevance of all the evidence presented for fear of the chilling consequences of mistakenly issuing a reconstituted title when in fact the original is not truly lost or destroyed.”[1]
The petitioner must prove the loss or destruction of the title by clear and convincing evidence, and not merely by preponderance of evidence. The Supreme Court in the Marcelino dela Paz case described clear and convincing evidence as follows:
“The established legal principle in actions involving land registration is that a party must prove its allegations not merely by a preponderance of evidence, but by clear and convincing evidence. Evidence is clear and convincing if it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. It is indeterminate, being more than preponderance, but not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases. Appropriately, this is the standard of proof that is required in reconstitution proceedings.
To our mind, clear and convincing evidence proving the jurisdictional requirements must exist before a court may order the reconstitution of a destroyed or lost title. An order reconstituting a title would produce two (2) effects: the cancellation of the alleged lost or destroyed title and the reissuance of a new duplicate title in its original form and condition. In addition, a reconstitution proceeding is an in rem proceeding; and when an order in such a proceeding becomes final, the findings therein can no longer be opened for review. With these in mind, evidence proving the petitioner's allegations in a petition for reconstitution is needed because, without proof that a certificate of title existed and was eventually lost or destroyed, this alleged lost or destroyed title is still presumed to exist.
Therefore, in order to forestall, if not eliminate entirely, anomalous or irregular reconstitution of a lost or destroyed title, the petitioner must clearly show with convincing evidence: (1) that a certificate of title was lost or destroyed; (2) that the certificate of title sought to be reconstituted is in its original form before it was lost; and (3) that the petitioner has legal interest over the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. (Emphasis supplied).”[2]
From the discussions above, the petition must present a witness who has personal knowledge of the fact of loss or destruction of the title. Said witness must also establish that he or she has custody of the title prior to its loss or destruction. The petitioner himself or herself must testify on his or her legal interest over the land.
With regard to the sources from which reconstitution of title may be made for transfer certificates of title, Section 3 of RA No. 26 enumerates the available sources in the following order:
Sec. 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:
(a) The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(b) The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the description of the 'property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was issued;
(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.
The enumeration and the particularity of the documents mentioned in Section 3 of RA 26 above must be observed. Otherwise, the court will deny the petition for insufficiency of evidence.
With regard to analogous documents in subparagraph (f) of Section 3, RA 26, the petition must show that he had in fact sought to secure the other documents mentioned before resorting to analogous documents as ruled by the Supreme Court in the Marcelino dela Paz case, thus:
“The documents alluded to in paragraph (f) must be resorted to in the absence of those preceding in order. If the petitioner for reconstitution fails to show that he had, in fact, sought to secure such prior documents (except with respect to the owner's duplicate copy of the title which it claims had been, likewise, destroyed) and had failed to find them, the presentation of the succeeding documents as substitutionary evidence is proscribed.”[3]
From the foregoing, a court will deny a petition on merit on the ground failure to prove the fact of loss of title by clear and convincing evidence. This failure may be attributed to the petitioner’s failure to present a witness who has personal knowledge of the fact of loss of the subject title and/or failure to present the required document from which a title may be reconstituted as enumerated in Section 3 of RA 26.
If after moving for reconsideration on the denial of the petition, what can the petitioner do? Should the petitioner appeal the denial to a higher court?
An appeal on the denial of the petition based in insufficiency of evidence or failure to prove the fact of loss based on clear and convincing evidence may be an exercise in futility. Unless there is a clear misapprehension of facts by the trial court, the appellate court (be it the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court) will not touch or reexamine the findings of facts of the trial court since the appellate courts are not trier of facts. Thus, if an appeal from the finding of facts of the trial court is no longer feasible, can the petitioner refile the same petition (having the same subject matter and party-petitioner) in the same judicial region as the court that denied the first case? Will res judicata set in to warrant the dismissal of the second (refiled) case?
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Benguet (G.R. No. 222958, March 11, 2020.)
In the case of Philippine Bank of Communications vs. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Benguet (G.R. No. 222958, March 11, 2020.), petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications filed a petition for the replacement of lost owner's duplicate Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21320 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, La Trinidad, Benguet. The court (RTC Br. 26) dismissed the petition for failure to prove the fact of loss. The Supreme Court noted the decision of the trial court as follows:
“It held that PBCOM failed to prove that it had ‘exerted all efforts to determine the actual whereabouts of TCT No. 21320 from all its available records and the bank's past and present officers or employees and legal counsel who could and should have knowledge of the bank's acquired property and the documents relative thereto.’ Noting the testimony of one (1) of PBCOM's witnesses that it is possible that the previous accountable officer did not turn over the title to the property or the lawyer who handled the foreclosure proceeding failed to include the owner's copy of TCT No. 21320 in the documents forwarded to their main office, the RTC, Branch 62 stressed that PBCOM should have exerted efforts to verify from these persons the whereabouts of the missing title because if any other person is known or suspected to be in possession of the copy of the title, either lawfully or unlawfully, the petition would not be the appropriate legal remedy.”
Instead of pursuing a reconsideration on the ruling of the trial court and appealing the decision, petitioner filed a second petition raffled to RTC, Branch 63. The allegations in the second petition were essentially the same as that contained in the first petition.
RTC-Branch 63 dismissed the second petition, motu proprio, on the ground of res judicata. As the first petition was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, i.e., an adjudication on the merits, RTC-Branch 63 held that the second petition involving the same parties and cause of action was barred by prior judgment.
From the dismissal of the second petition by RTC Br. 63, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, claiming that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion (1) in dismissing the second petition on the ground of res judicata and (2) in dismissing, without first determining, whether the evidence presented in the first petition was identical to the evidence intended to be presented in the second petition. PBCOM claimed that the dismissal of the first petition did not bar the filing of a second petition, for otherwise, it would be forever barred from securing a "replacement copy of the missing title."
Is there res judicata? If the dismissal of the first petition constitutes res judicata to bar the subsequent filing of a similar petition, is the owner of a real property forever barred from securing a replacement copy of the missing title?
The Supreme Court ruled that there is no res judicata, i.e., the filing of the second petition is not barred by the dismissal of the first petition. The Supreme Court ruled as follows:
“A registered owner who fails to prove the loss or destruction of his/her owner's duplicate certificate of title may not be barred from refiling a new petition to replace the same.
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. In The Heirs of Alfredo Cullado v. Gutierrez,[4] the Court explained:
Indeed, the bedrock of the Torrens system is the indefeasibility and incontrovertibility of a land title where there can be full faith reliance thereon. Verily, the Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. To the registered owner, the Torrens system gives him complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land. On the part of a person transacting with a registered land, like a purchaser, he can rely on the registered owner's title and he should not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition or transaction was ineffectual after all, which will not only be unfair to him, but will also erode public confidence in the system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily conclusive investigations and proof of ownership.
In other words, ownership of registered land is evidenced by the certificate of title, which is indefeasible and incontrovertible. Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 152939 or the 'Property Registration Decree mandates the issuance of this certificate of title in duplicates — the original certificate of title, which is either an original certificate of title or TCT to be kept by the Register of Deeds and an owner's duplicate certificate of title to be kept by the registered owner. P.D. 1529 provides:
xxx”
To summarize the foregoing, in a petition to reconstitute title, the petitioner must prove by clear and convincing evidence the fact of loss and reconstitute the title from the list of documents mentioned in chronological order in Section 3 of RA 26. If the court denies the petition for insufficiency of evidence, unless there was a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court in denying the petition, the petitioner may refile the same petition in the same judicial region where the property is located. For the second petition, prudence dictate that the petitioner should present more convincing evidence to avoid a second denial.
[1] Citing the cases: Anciano v. Caballes, 93 Phil. 875, 876 (1953); Lee v. Republic of the Phils., [418 Phil. 793, 800 (2001)]; Heirs of the late Pedro Pinote v. Dulay, [265 Phil. 12, 21 (1990)]; Alipoon v. Court of Appeals, [364 Phil. 591, 598 (1999)], Republic of the Phils. v. Pasicolan, [758 Phil. 121, 141 (2015)].
[2] Citing the cases: Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation, [565 Phil. 59, 92 (2007)]; Republic v. Imperial Credit Corporation, [578 Phil. 300, 308 (2008)]; Diaz-Enriquez v. Republic of the Phils., [480 Phil. 787, 798 (2004)]; Manotok v. Heirs of Homer Barque, [643 Phil. 57, 67 (2010)], citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.,[462 Phil. 546, 562 (2003)]; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 181 [Phil. 432, 439 (1979)]. Reiterated in Alabang Development Corporation v. Valenzuela, [201 [Phil. 727, 744 (1982)]; Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Sison, [209 Phil. 325, 337 (1983)]; Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, [272-A Phil. 467, 478 (1991)]; and Ortigas & Co., Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco, [343 PhiL 115, 136 (1997)]; Republic of the Phils. v. Catarroja, [626 Phil. 389, 396 (2010)]; Republic of the Phils. v. Heirs of Spouses Sanchez, [749 Phil. 999, 1004 (2014)]; Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System v. Sison, [209 Phil. 325, 335 (1983)]; Essa Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Lim, [208 Phil. 394, 406 (1983)].
[3] Citing the case of Republic of the Phils. v. Holazo, 480 Phil. 828, 840 (2004)
[4] G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019
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